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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM AND
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
HENRY LANDAU*
Recent years have seen changing attitudes toward the status
and role of existing and prospective foreign investments and
the rights and property of foreign investors. In the developing
nations, the change was brought about in response to unful-
filled rising expectations and nationalistic fervor, as well as
by desires for economic self-determination and achievement of
development goals with a minimum of outside help. The atti-
tudes of the developed nations were shaped by extensive eco-
nomic penetration by foreign interests and a concomittant fear
of outside control of major sectors of their economies.
DEVELOPING NATIONS
The economies of the developing nations are largely agri-
cultural. Because they lacked technical and managerial skills
and capital resources, their governments clamored for, and the
international agencies urged the infusion of, private foreign
investments to transform agrarian societies into industrialized
nations, provide employment, increase national standards of
living, and earn foreign exchange needed for infrastructure de-
velopment.'
Exploration and subsequent exploitation of natural re-
sources required investment of substantial high-risk capital and
the application of sophisticated technology, with no expectation
of immediate return on the investment.2 The installation and
operation of large-scale public utilities called for technology,
operational skills and investors willing to accept a small yield
on their investment, none of which were available locally.
To attract the required capital, technology and skills the
developing countries were willing to enter into long-term con-
cession agreements, operating agreements and investment agree-
* Member of the New York Bar; Adjunct Professor of Law, Baruch College
City University of New York; B.A. Columbia, J.D. Columbia; member
Commission on International Trade Practice, International Chamber of
Commerce.
1 See generally The Capital Needs of the Less Developed Countries, Report
of Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 102/5 (1962); Financing of Eco-
nomic Development - Promotion of Private Foreign Investment, U.N.
Doc. E/4293 (1967); International Chamber of Commerce, Public and
Private Invstment in Economic Development BR 179 (1955).
2 It took, "almost $150,000 to find and develop Boliva's oil and gas re-
sources," and "it took ten years and $95,000,000 before Gulf could export
one drop cf oil from Bolivia," Lumpkin, Gulf Oil's Experience in Bolivia,
8 HOUSTON L. REV. 472 (1971).
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ments. Additionally, many offered incentives which were then
thought to be commensurate with the size of the investment,
the risk involved and the benefits the investment would bring
to the countries. The foreign investor responded, relying upon
the promises embodied in these agreements.
Fundamental socio-economical and political developments,
resulting from pressures of the dissatisfied, produced an out-
look unfavorable to foreign investments. Vying for popular
support, the ruling groups in many developing countries identify
themselves with the needs and aspirations of the people. To
allay the frustrations of the populace and to divert its attention
from the ruling grodps' failure to solve the countries econom-
ic and political problems, they exploit the fear of foreign economic
domination, brand the foreign investor an economic imperalist
and blame him for nonachievement of development goals. By
appeals to national pride and by use of the fashionable slogans
of nationalism and economic independence,3 they take measures
to abrogate or modify rights previously granted to the foreign
investor and take over his property.
In countries where natural resources are the primary source
of wealth, the extractive industries are the principle objects of
take-overs. Natural resources, especially minerals and petroleum,
are exhaustible. It is often charged that their extraction by
foreign investors is not in the best interest of the country.
These resources are generally the main source of export earn-
ings. As a result there is pressure, in the face of rising national-
ism, upon the governments in many developing countries to
secure greater control over these industries in hopes of obtain-
ing a larger share of the foreign exchange earnings they pro-
duce.
The trend to expropriate extractive industries became evi-
dent a decade ago when Uruguay introduced the United Nations
Resolution 1803 calling on each member "to recognize the right
of each country to nationalize and freely exploit its natural
wealth as an essential factor of economic independence. ' ' 4 Re-
cently, Algeria's President Houari Boumediene was quoted as
having said, "Until now the riches of the Third World have
served the interests of the rich nations. It is time for those
3 Brigadier General Guillermo Rodriguez Larahas said that, "There is no
political tendency in our revolution and no ideology. There is national-
ism, there is the Fatherland at the beginning, the middle and the end,
and there is a desire to serve the Ecuadorian people." N.Y. Times, Mar.
9, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
4 7 GAOR 7 (1952), U.N. Doc. A/C2/L.165 (1952).
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nations to understand that economic colonialism-like political
colonialism before it-must vanish."
As a result of this trend, the foreign owned companies are
continually pressured to agree to a revision of their concession
agreements to provide the host country with an ever increasing
share of the companies' earnings and, in addition, demands are
made upon them for equity participation." To force the sale
of an equity interest, the governments sometimes impose un-
attainable production quotas, limit the amount of exports, or
subject the enterprise to harassing government regulations.
7
5 Sheehan, The Algerians Intend to Go It Alone, Raise Hell, Hold Out and
Grow, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1972, (Magazine) at 18.
6 In 1969 Chile and Zambia took over more than 70% of profits of the
copper extracting companies and leading oil producing countries in-
ing Libya, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela received more
than five billion dollars in tax revenues. On September 4, 1970, the
government of Sierra Leone acquired a majority interest in diamond
mining operations in Sierra Leone. In 1972 the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, consisting of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Quatar and Aubu Dhabl demanded a 20% participation in the Persian
Gulf concessions as the only alternative to nationalization. In 1961 Mexico
passed a new mining law restricting foreign capital in mineral develop-
ment thereby compelling Asarco Mexicana S.A. and Industrias Penoles
S.A., subsidiaries of American Smelting and Refining Company, to
sell 51% intrest to Mxican nationals. On May 18, 1972, the Mexican
government announced the "Mexicanization" of the country's sulphur
industry with the acquisition of Azufrera Panamerica, 34% owned by
Pan American Sulphur Company, of which the government will own
80% and private individuals 20%.
Under the Chileazation program, foreign-owned copper companies
were initially compelled to sell a portion of their 100% interest.
After the passage of a new mining law on February 7, 1961, which
provides for fading-out of majority foreign interests, Mexican interests
acquired a majority interest in Asarco Mexicana S.A., formerly a 100%
owned subsidiary of American Smelting and Refining Company, and of
Industries Penoles, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax. Algeria
converted its minority interest into a majority interest in a number of
oil and gas companies. Kenya acquired a 50% interest in a petroleum
refining company owned by a foreign consortium. The Bolivian Govern-
ment announced the nationalization of the nitrate industry by its acquisi-
tion of the 49% equity interest of Eequimich from Anglo Lautara, 51% of
which was already owned by the Government. In 1971, a state-owned
Chilean steel company acquired Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines Company,
an iron mining concern, wholly-owned by Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
Guyana took over Demerera Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of Alumi-
nium Company of Canada. Haiti cancelled a refining concession agree-
ment held by Haitian Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Valentine
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. Peru expropriated the refinery
complex and oil fields of International Petroleum Company, Ltd. Al-
geria nationalized or intervened in a number of natural gas, oil and pipe-
line companies and refineries. Libya nationalized the petroleum import
and distribution facilities of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Gulf Oil
Company was compelled to relinquish its exploration concession.
Uganda nationalized a number of foreign-owned oil and mineral com-
panies. Zaire (formerly Congo, Kinshasa) took over the concessions
and facilities of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. Burma nationalized
Burmean Oil Corporation. Ceylon nationalized distribution facilities
and related equipment of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Cali-
fornia-Texas Oil Co.
7 Iraq's demand for a 20% participation was accompanied by an increase
in the production quota. The sale by Compania Azufrera Mexicana,
S.A., a subsidiary of Pan American Sulfur Incorporated of its 43%
interest to the Mexican government and of its 43% interest to private
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The threat of nationalization is often sufficient to induce the
sale of the enterprise at a price below that ordinarily obtainable.
The chairman of Pan American Sulphur Company, which
in May 1972, sold its interest in Azufrera Panamerica to the
Mexican Government said, "This was not an expropriation at
all. It was a voluntary arms length transaction."" However, Pan
American Sulphur Company was reportedly happy to sell out
because it was displeased with some government regulations.
The sale followed an anti-dumping investigation by the U.S.
Treasury Department, and Horacio Flores de la Pana, Mexico's
National Properties' Secretary, told a news conference, "The less
share we have of U.S. markets, the less reason there is to share
our sulphur earnings with U.S. investors."9
In several countries, there was outright expropriation and
in others the take-over followed the acquisition of equity par-
ticipations of petroleum and mining companies. To keep these
basic natural resources completely under local control, the ex-
propriating governments abrogated or annulled even recent
concessions and took over the enterprises' properties, machinery,
distribution and other facilities in the belief that they could- suc-
cessfully operate these companies and thus obtain funds for
their development programs. 10 In a number of countries the
Mexican nationals, and the sale by Compania Explotadora del Istneo,
S.A., a subsidiary of Texas Gulf Sulfur of its 66% interest to Mexican
nationals followed the Mexican government imposition of quotas limit-
ing their exports.
8 N.Y. Times, May 19, 1972, at 49, col. 1.
9 Id.
10 On November 15, 1963, by Decree 743-45, Argentina annulled petroleum
exploration and development contracts awarded to seven companies,
some of which continued operating, in Argentina. In 1969 Bolivia national-
ized all assets of Bolivian Gulf Oil Company. In 1971 the government of
Juan Jose Torres Gonzalez abrogated International Metals Processing
Corporation's dredging concession, granted in 1965, and the twenty-year
lease of zinc, cadmium, lead, silver and gold granted in 1966 to Mina
Matilde Company, owned by U.S. Steel and Mineral & Chemical Corpora-
tion. In 1972 the disputes concerning the International Metal Processing
and Mina Matilde confiscations were resolved by the government of
Col. Hugo Banzer Suares, by the creation of mixed enterprises under
private management. In May 1970 the Bolivian Government announced
the nationalization of the nitrate industry by acquisition of 49% equity
interest of Soquimech, of which it then owned 51%. In 1971 a state-
owned Chilean steel company acquired Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines
Company, an iron mining concern, wholly-owned by Bethlehem Steel
Corporation. Guyana took over Demera Bauxite Company, a subsidiary
of Aluminum Company. Haiti cancelled a refining concession agreement
held by Haitian Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Valentine Petrole-
um and Chemical Corportation. Peru expropriated the refinery complex
and oil fields of International Petroleum Company, Ltd.. Algeria national
ized or intervened in a number of natural gas, oil and pipeline companies
and refineries. Libya nationalized the petroleum import and distribution
facilities of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Gulf Oil Company was
compelled to relinquish its exploration conces-sion. Uganda nationalized
a number of foreign-owned oil and mineral companies. Zaire (formerly
Congo, Kinshasa) took over the concessions and facilities of Union
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outlook regarding basic utilities and essential services resulted
in similar measures with respect to foreign owned communica-




The nationalistic urge to eliminate or reduce foreign in-
fluence is not confined to basic industries. Even as U.N. Reso-
lution 1803 reflects the desire to preserve control over natural
resources, U.N. Resolution 2158 (XXI) recognizes "the right of
all countries and particularly of the developing countries to
secure and increase their share in the administration of enter-
prises which are fully or partly operated by foreign capital and
to have a greater share in the advantages and profits derived
therefrom on an equitable basis." 14 The policy enunciated in
Resolution 2158 was given a fuller expression in the message
of Mexico's President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz to the Mexican Con-
gress on September 1, 1966.
Those who would like to open the door to foreign invest-
ments without limit or protection forget that through our eco-
nomic development we strive to consolidate national independ-
ence as quickly as possible. With reference to direct foreign
investment, we propose that they be associated in minority part-
nership with local capital. Far from granting preferential treat-
ment, we try to limit their field of activities by proposing ex-
clusiveness of the Nation in basic indusry and require a majority
of Mexican capital in certain secondary industry closely linked
with basic industries. 15
The policies thus expressed were carried out by excluding
foreign interests from new and existing stipulated industries
and activities deemed vital to national economies, and by con-
Maniere du Haut Katanga. Burma nationalized Burmean Oil Corporation.
Ceylon nationalized distribution facilities and related equipment of
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and California-Texas Oil Co.
11 Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico took over the properties of
American Foreign Power Company, and Chile acquired a 70% interest
in South American Power, a Boise Cascade subsidiary. Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador and Peru expropriated telephone and cable facilities owned by
subsidiaries of International Telephone & Telegraph Company. Somalia
took over the Italian-Somali Electric Co.
12 Chile, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Burma nationalized foreign-
owned banks. Peru restricted foreign ownership in domestic banks to
25%, and Decision 24 of the Andean Subregional Common Market
Commission limited foreign interest in domestic banks to 20%. Venezuela
restricted banking functions of banks having a foreign interest until
80% of the capital shall be owned by Venezuelans.
13 Libya, Uganda, Indonesia and Iraq tcok over foreign owned insurance
companies. Tanzanian Insurance (vesting of interest and -egulation) Act
of 1967 provides for compulsory sale to National Insuranc ; Company of
foreign owned shares of insurance companies operating in Tanzania.
Sudan ordered all foreign owned insurance companies to cease writing
new business.
14 G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Supp. 16 (1966).
15 Creel, Mexicanizations: A Case of Creeping Expropriation, 22 Sw. L.J.
281, 294 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Creel].
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trolling and regulating foreign investments in other, even small,
established and prospective enterprises.'0
Foreign participation in new projects is controlled by in-
sisting upon, or encouraging, substantial local participation, 7
restricting foreign wholly owned enterprises1 8 and by offering
incentives to enterprises owned jointly by foreign and local
interests. 19
The extent of foreign ownership and control of existing
enterprises is regulated by provisions of investment laws or
investment agreements, which confer upon the government the
right of participation in enterprises,20 and by laws and decrees
which call for a fade-out of the foreign interest through the sale
of fixed percentages of equity within prescribed periods of
time.
2 1
16 Brazil excludes foreigners from ownership and operations of domestic
air lines, coastal shipping, newspapers and telecommunications. Mexico
reserves control of radio and television broadcasting, production, dis-
tribution and export of motion pictures, transportation, fish hatcheries
and fishing, publishing and publicity, production, distribution and sale
of aerated beverages, manufacture and distribution of rubber products,
and insecticides and basic chemical products. In Indonesia, foreigners
are excluded from telecommunications, production and transmission of
electricity, aviation, ownership of railroads, mass media and other in-
dustries considered vital. El Salvador reserves enterprises with capital
of $40,000 or less for persons born in El Salvador or other Central
American countries. The Ghanian Business (Promotion) Act of 1970
transferred foreign owned small and medium sized retail and wholesale
businesses to Ghanians.
17 Mexican Decree No. 4990 (D.O. 2nd July 1971) provides for Mexicaniza-
tion of oil, steel, aluminum, cement, glass, fertilizer and cellulose indus-
tries. In India, a majority foreign ownership is not permitted except
where the enterprise will contribute needed technology, or require a
substantial amount of foreign exchange or produce substantial export
earnings. Ceylon and Thailand prefer joint enterprise. Philippines pre-
fers joint ventures and limits foreign interest to 40% in certain areas and
in industries developing natural resources. In Nigeria at least 55% gov-
ernment equity is required in iron, basic steel, petrochemical and
fertilizer production industries. At least 35% private participation is
required in some small businesses even though local investment capital
is not available for such participation.
Is In several Latin American and African countries control is exercised
through initial screening and approval which among other things affects
remissicn of profits and repatriation of invested capital.
19 In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Malaysia investment in-
centives are available only to joint enterprises, with substantial local
participation.
20 In Congo (Brazzaville) the government reserves the right to take equity
participation. In Ghana large scale enterprises are required to offer
to the government participation in new issues.
21 Mexico requires a reduction of the majority foreign interest within
five years in important industries and ten to fifteen years in others.
Also, sales of stock to foreigners in Mexican companies which will result
in a foreign owned majority are discouraged. See Creel, supra note 15.
Ceylon requires a gradual transfer of majority interest to its nationals.
In the Philippines, pioneer industries must iist their stock on the ex-
change within ten years and sell 60% of the equity to Philippinos within
twenty years. Zambia's President Kaunde proposed that the state should
take a 51% interest in 25 companies engaged in the manufacturer and
sale of building materials, road transportation, brewing and wholesale
and retail trade. Peru requires all foreign owned concerns to enter into
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At times, political motives for the elimination of the for-
eign interest loom as large as the economic motives. In the
preamble to the Bolivian Supreme Decree G.O. 474 of the
17th of October 1969, the stated reason for the expropriation
of Gulf Oil is that "[T]he Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation has
grown into a new superstate economically and politically more
powerful than the Bolivian State." Libya nationalized the prop-
erties of the British Petroleum Company for "colluding" in
Iran's invasion of the Arab island in the Persian Gulf. The
United Arab Republic threatened to nationalize the properties
of West German companies should West Germany establish for-
mal diplomatic relations with Israel. The effect of moves such
as these is that "foreign investments are the most exposed
targets of frustration, irrational policies and misguided na-
tionalism."
22
The efforts to rid the country of real or imagined foreign
domination may satisfy national pride and serve political in-
terests, but only at the expense of the country's economic in-
terest. Most of the developing countries have not reached a
stage of technical and managerial expertise which can provide
a sustained efficient operation of the expropriated industries.
Absent such expertise, there will be no earnings for self-sus-
tained growth and for upgrading of the standard of life. For
example, Chile's labor and technical problems limited copper
production from the expropriated mines to 750,000 tons instead
of the planned one million tons.23 Bolivia exports one-third of
the tin it exported prior to expropriation.
24
Perhaps in recognition of their own limitations, some de-
veloping countries have reversed the trend toward economic
nationalism. Guinea, which in 1961 took over Bauxites du Midi,
a subsidiary of Alcan, was unable to fulfill its contractual obli-
fade out agreements providing for the sale of its shares to reduce the
foreign ownership to 85% by July 1974, to 55% by July 1981 and to
49% by July 1986. In December 1970 the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration published its Decision 24,
later superseded by Decision 37, proposing uniform rules to exclude
foreign investments in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and
to reduce foreign participation to a minority interest in the future, by
subjecting existing companies to divestment of equity and manage-
ment through mandatory fadeout agreements in key industries and de-
priving other industries cf the Central American Common Market bene-
fits if they do not avail themselves of the option to enter into fadeout
agreements. (See Schliesser, Restriction on Foreign Investment in the
Andean Common Market, 5 INT. LAW 586, (1971).
22 President Nixon's "State of the World Message," 116 Cong. Rec. 3821
(1970).
23 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1971.
24 Expropriation, Why They Do It, FORBES, July 15, 1971, at 36.
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gation to mine and export bauxite, and by 1963 was compelled
to turn over the operation to a new enterprise in which the
government holds a minority interest. On May 1, 1971, President
Amin of Ghana reversed the policy of former President Obote
to require a 60% Ghanian ownership in commercial banks, min-
ing, transportation and other important private companies by
reducing the government's participation therein to a 49% in-
terest. Cambodia, which nationalized the petroleum industries
in 1967, at first granted a twelve year grace period to Standard
Oil Company (N.J.) and to California Texaco Company, and in
1970 repealed the Nationalization Act. In October 1967, Sierra
Leone revoked the "Non-Citizens Trade and Business Act of
1966" which excluded non-citizens from certain industries. In
1970 the assets of Sterling Drug Company were nationalized
and subsequently denationalized.
Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suares, referring to the
transfer of the previously confiscated tin dredging operation
of International Mining and Processing Company and of the
Matilde Zinc Mine, to mixed companies under private manage-
ment, stated, "[T]here is no need now for major nationalization
and we want foreign capital to develop our resources on a fair
basis. We have enough problems making the already national-
ized mines work efficiently.
' ' 25
An in-flow of advancing technology as well as a large
amount of foreign capital is essential if the industrial develop-
ment of the developing countries is to continue at a desirable
pace. The pursuit of policies grounded on economic and politi-
cal nationalism will impede that flow.
The Executive Committee of the International Chamber of
Commerce was prophetic when it issued its statement that it
feared
the overall effect of Decision 24 (of the Commission of the Car-
tagena Agreement) will be: to deter rather than to attract the
transfer of technology, to adversely affect the balance of pay-
ments and to result in a wasteful utilization of local capital re-
sources. The ICC further fears that Decision 24, instead of con-
tributing towards the attainment of its stated objectives, will im-
pede rather than promote progress toward development, national
participation and regional integration.
20
The restrictive investment policies of the Andean group caused
56 companies to hold up 84 definitive or potential projects in
1971.27
25 N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
26 37 ICC INFORMATION 9 (1971).
27 Learning to Live with Expropiation, BUSINESSS WEEK, July 10, 1971, at 34.
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation insured only $8
million of new U.S. investments in Latin America during the
last quarter of fiscal 1971 against an average level of $100 mil-
lion for each quarter of the preceding four years.
28 The gain in
national pride and the short term political advantages are a high
price to pay for the economic and social advantages which would
have resulted from the abandoned and lost projects.
DEvELOPED CouNTmIEs
Foreign investors no longer have an unrestricted access to
the economies of all developed countries. There is a growing
concern that some sectors of their economies will be dominated
by U.S. and other foreign interests.
2
11 Governments and business
communities are particularly disturbed by the role of the giant
international corporations and their impact on the local social
and economic conditions. 30 They are concerned that decisions
affecting production, employment and marketing are made out-
side the country and are influenced by the business and national
interests of the foreign parent company rather than those of the
local operating company. 31
Several developed countries have adopted, or are contem-
plating adopting, measures to control or to curb foreign in-
vestments. Japan weighs the competitive effect of new ventures
on existing Japanese industry and does not permit the entry of
a competitive enterprise. All agreements between Japanese and
foreign business concerns must be approved by the Ministry
of International Trade. There is insistence that management be
in the hands of Japanese, and there must be a Japanese ma-
jority equity interest if government approval is required for
remission of earnings and repatriation of capital.
32
The European Economic Community Commission prefers
enterprises within the Community, capitalized by nationals of
the Community's members and whose centers of decision will
be within the Community. In France, Law #66-1008 conferred
upon the government the power to regulate foreign invest-
28 OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT, at 6 (1971).
29 See generally S. SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1968).
30 Valery Gisard d'Estaing, French Minister of Finance, has said, "Multi-
national companies are growing out of all proportion with national firms.
This is a problem with which the government must be concerned."
31 Louis Camu, president of the Bank of Brussels, has said, "Make the
power of decision coincide with operational activity." London Financial
Times Symposium, 1970.
3 2
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Report No. 428-429, April 30,
1965; E. LANG, Doing Business in Japan - A New Look at Licensing and
Joint Ventures, BusINESS ABROAD (1970).
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ments.33 Foreign investments are screened, and special permits
are required for large investments. Under Decree #67-78 all
acquisitions or increases of control must have the approval of the
Ministry of Finance.3
4
The problem of foreign investments, particularly U.S. in-
vestments, are important issues in Canada and Australia. Cana-
dians are perturbed by a high percentage of foreign ownership
and by their belief that some foreign owned industries are run
likes branches of the parent companies with little or no sensi-
tivity to local conditions.
In 1971, the First National City Bank of New York, which
was the only foreign owned bank in Canada, sold, under pres-
sure, its 75% interest in the Mercantile Bank. In 1972, in re-
sponse to the Grey Commission Report, which dealt with the
influence of foreign investments, acquisitions of existing com-
panies will be under the control of the Canadian government.
United States investments in Australia are attacked by
politicians and economic nationalists, and the government is
examining the role that the large foreign enterprises play in
the Australian economy. John Douglas Anthony, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, said that the
government intends to police foreign investments and hinted
at a requirement for a higher percentage of Australians in own-
ership and management.
Economic nationalism exists in all parts of the world. Its
intensity, the manner in which it is expressed, the way in which
it operates and its impact on foreign investments varies from
country to country. However, it is generally related to the
country's political and economic maturity and stability. The
foreign investor must, therefore, conform to the national goals,
aims and economic policies of the host country.35
33 Torem and Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign Investment in
France, 70 MICH. L. R. 285, 286 (1971).
34 Id.
35 To promote "collaboration between partners which is so vital if the eco-
nomic growth of the Third World is to be accelerated" the Commission
on International Investments and Economic Development of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce is preparing a guide for international
private investment which will contain recommendations addressed to the
investors, as well as to the governments of host countries and of the
countries of the investors.
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